2016年11月22日 星期二

Ven. Bhikkhu Thanissaro 長老坦尼沙羅:無我還是非我 No-self or Not-self?


以下引自部落格《顯密文庫》(http://read.goodweb.cn/news/news_view.asp?newsid=23913)
無我,還是非我? No-self or Not-self?
作者] 坦尼沙羅尊者 Ven. Thanissaro Bhikkhu
[中譯]良稹
西方人了解佛教的過程中經常遭遇的第一個障礙,是有關 anatta的教導,這個詞常被譯成無我(no-self)。這個教導成為障礙,有兩個理由。首先,沒有自我這個觀點與佛陀的其他教導並不吻合,比如業與輪迴。假如沒有自我,是什麼承受業的後果,繼續輪迴?第二,它與我們自己的猶太-基督教背景也難以吻合,後者把永恒的靈魂或者自我,當成一個基本前提。假如沒有自我,靈性生活的目的又是什麼?許多書籍試圖解答這個問題,但是如果查看記載著現存最早的佛陀教導的巴利文獻,你在經中根本找不到與此相關的陳述。實際上只有一處,有人當面直接問佛陀,自我是否存在,而他却拒絕回答了。後來有人問他為什麼,他說,認定有我、無我兩個觀點中的任何一個,均屬極端妄見,不可能走上佛法修持之路。因此,這樣的問題應該放在一邊。為了理解他對這個問題保持緘默意味著anatta 的釋義是什麼,我們首先必須閱讀他的教導,有關怎樣提出問題、解答問題、以及怎樣理解他的答復。
One of the first stumbling blocks that Westerners often encounter when they learn about Buddhism is the teaching on anatta, often translated as no-self. This teaching is a stumbling block for two reasons. First, the idea of there being no self doesn't fit well with other Buddhist teachings, such as the doctrine of kamma and rebirth: If there's no self, what experiences the results of kamma and takes rebirth? Second, it doesn't fit well with our own Judeo-Christian background, which assumes the existence of an eternal soul or self as a basic presupposition: If there's no self, what's the purpose of a spiritual life? Many books try to answer these questions, but if you look at the Pali Canon — the earliest extant record of the Buddha's teachings — you won't find them addressed at all. In fact, the one place where the Buddha was asked point-blank whether or not there was a self, he refused to answer. When later asked why, he said that to hold either that there is a self or that there is no self is to fall into extreme forms of wrong view that make the path of Buddhist practice impossible. Thus the question should be put aside. To understand what his silence on this question says about the meaning of anatta, we first have to look at his teachings on how questions should be asked and answered, and how to interpret his answers.
佛陀把一切問題分為四類:一類值得明確答復(直接的是與否);一類值得分析式答復,即對該問題加以定義與限制;一類值得反問,即把球送回提問者的場地;一類值得放在一邊。這最後一類,則包括那些不能終止苦與緊張的問題。一位老師接到問題時,首要責任是弄清這個問題屬於哪一類,之後以相應方式作答。比如你對一個該放在一邊的問題,便不以是與否作答。假如你是提問者,得到一個答復後,便要決定對其推論該走多遠。佛陀說,誤解他的人有兩類: 一類對不該作推論的陳述去作推論,還有一類該作推論却不作。
The Buddha divided all questions into four classes: those that deserve a categorical (straight yes or no) answer; those that deserve an analytical answer, defining and qualifying the terms of the question; those that deserve a counter-question, putting the ball back in the questioner's court; and those that deserve to be put aside. The last class of question consists of those that don't lead to the end of suffering and stress. The first duty of a teacher, when asked a question, is to figure out which class the question belongs to, and then to respond in the appropriate way. You don't, for example, say yes or no to a question that should be put aside. If you are the person asking the question and you get an answer, you should then determine how far the answer should be interpreted. The Buddha said that there are two types of people who misrepresent him: those who draw inferences from statements that shouldn't have inferences drawn from them, and those who don't draw inferences from those that should.
這些便是理解佛陀教導的基本原則,不過如果看看多數作者對 anatta學說的解釋,我們發現這些基本原則給忽略了。有些作者試圖對無我的詮釋加以限定,說佛陀否定的是永恒自我或者獨立自我的存在,不過這樣做,是對一個佛陀表明該放在一邊的問題,給出分析式答復。其他人則試圖從經文中幾個似乎暗示自我不存在的陳述裡作推論,不過可以肯定,迫使這些句子對一個該放在一邊的問題給出答案,那麼他是在作不當推論。
These are the basic ground rules for interpreting the Buddha's teachings, but if we look at the way most writers treat the anatta doctrine, we find these ground rules ignored. Some writers try to qualify the no-self interpretation by saying that the Buddha denied the existence of an eternal self or a separate self, but this is to give an analytical answer to a question that the Buddha showed should be put aside. Others try to draw inferences from the few statements in the discourse that seem to imply that there is no self, but it seems safe to assume that if one forces those statements to give an answer to a question that should be put aside, one is drawing inferences where they shouldn't be drawn.
因此,與其對自我是否存在這個問題回答「不存在」——無論這個自我是指相關、獨立、是否永恒——佛陀認為這個問題從一開始就有誤導性。為什麼?無論你怎樣劃定「我」與「他」的界線,自我這個概念包含了某種自我認同與執取因素,因此就帶著苦與緊張。這個分析適用於一個獨立的自我,也適用於一個與外界相通的自我,這樣的自我不承認「他」。假如一個人認同自然的一切,他便為每一株落木而苦。這個分析也適用於對整個「其他」宇宙[的認同],在那裡的隔絕感與徒勞感極其有害,使人對快樂的追求(無論為己為他)成為不可能。出於這些原因,佛陀的忠告是,不要去注意「我存在嗎?」、或者「我不存在嗎」這類問題,因為無論你怎樣回答,都會導致苦與張力。
So, instead of answering ‘no’ to the question of whether or not there is a self — interconnected or separate, eternal or not — the Buddha felt that the question was misguided to begin with. Why? No matter how you define the line between ‘self’ and ‘other’, the notion of self involves an element of self-identification and clinging, and thus suffering and stress. This holds as much for an interconnected self, which recognizes no ‘other’, as it does for a separate self. If one identifies with all of nature, one is pained by every felled tree. It also holds for an entirely ‘other’ universe, in which the sense of alienation and futility would become so debilitating as to make the quest for happiness — one's own or that of others — impossible. For these reasons, the Buddha advised paying no attention to such questions as ‘Do I exist?’ or ‘Don't I exist?’ for however you answer them, they lead to suffering and stress.
為了避免有關「我」與「他」的問題內部隱含的苦,他提出另一種解析經驗的方式:有關苦、苦因、滅苦、滅苦之道的四聖諦。他說,不要把這些事看成與我、與他有關,而應該把它們看成存在現實本身、直接的經驗本身,接下來對它們各自施行相應的責任。應當去理解張力、消除其因、實現其止息、培養止息之道。 這些責任,構成了理解anatta學說的最佳背景。如果你培養了戒德、定力、明辨,達到一個寧靜的狀態,在這個狀態下,以四聖諦的原則看待經驗,在心中升起的問題就不是「有沒有自我?我是什麼?」,而是「我在受苦,是不是因為我執著於這個特别現象?它真的是我、我自己、我的嗎?如果它是苦,但實際上却不是我或者我的,又為什麼要執著呢?」後面那組問題,就值得一個直接了當的答復了,因為這時的答案能幫助你理解苦,放下導致苦的追求與執著,即放下殘餘的自我認同,直到最後,一切自我認同的痕跡消失,剩下的是無限的自由。
To avoid the suffering implicit in questions of ‘self’ and ‘other’, he offered an alternative way of dividing up experience: the four Noble Truths of stress, its cause, its cessation, and the path to its cessation. Rather than viewing these truths as pertaining to self or other, he said, one should recognize them simply for what they are, in and of themselves, as they are directly experienced, and then perform the duty appropriate to each. Stress should be comprehended, its cause abandoned, its cessation realized, and the path to its cessation developed. These duties form the context in which the anatta doctrine is best understood. If you develop the path of virtue, concentration, and discernment to a state of calm well-being and use that calm state to look at experience in terms of the Noble Truths, the questions that occur to the mind are not ‘Is there a self?’ ‘What is my self?’ but rather ‘Am I suffering stress because I'm holding onto this particular phenomenon? Is it really me, myself, or mine? If it's stressful but not really me or mine, why hold on?’. These last questions merit straightforward answers, as they then help you to comprehend stress and to chip away at the attachment and clinging — the residual sense of self-identification — that cause it, until ultimately all traces of self-identification are gone and all that's left is limitless freedom.
在這個意義上,anatta 的教導並非是個無我(no-self)的學說,而是一個非我(not-self)的策略,藉著放下苦因、走向最高快樂,這樣來消解苦。在那時,我、無我、非我這些問題就落到了一邊。有了這樣徹底自由的經驗,又何必關心是誰、是不是我在經歷它呢?
In this sense, the anatta teaching is not a doctrine of no-self, but a not-self strategy for shedding suffering by letting go of its cause, leading to the highest, undying happiness. At that point, questions of self, no-self, and not-self fall aside. Once there's the experience of such total freedom, where would there be any concern about what's experiencing it, or whether or not it's a self? 
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版主按語:
長老坦尼沙羅 Bhikkhu Thanissaro 望重教界,亦為歐美學者宿所尊重、敬仰。版主並非想唐突長老,只是以漢譯佛典的立場提出一些疑問,以求釐清經義。
網路上對朱倍賢(William Chu)的〈非我〉上下兩篇貼文頗有爭論,大致來說,朱倍賢承接長老坦尼沙羅此文,而主張「anatta」為「非我 not-self」,並或隱或顯地指稱「無我 no-self」是誤解。
歸根究柢,還是回到此文為議題的根本。
儘管長老坦尼沙羅文中提到無須爭論「非我 not-self」或「無我 no-self」,但是文中還是以頗大的篇幅討論此一爭論,讓我們從漢譯經典的方向思考此文的主張吧。
《雜阿含335經》:「云何為第一義空經?諸比丘!眼生時無有來處,滅時無有去處。如是眼不實而生,生已盡滅,有業報而無作者,此陰滅已,異陰相續,除俗數法。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 92, c16-19)
《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷9〈分別世品 3〉:「世尊亦言:『有業有異熟,作者不可得。謂能捨此蘊及能續餘蘊,唯除法假。』」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 47, c4-5)
《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷30〈破執我品 9〉:「如勝義空契經中說:『有業有異熟,作者不可得。謂能捨此蘊及能續餘蘊,唯除法假。』」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 155, b25-27)。
《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷25:「如世尊說:『有業有異熟,作者不可得。謂能捨此蘊及能續餘蘊,唯除法假。』」(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 485, a15-17)
巴利《清淨道論》呼應了此一教導:
For there is suffering, but none who suffers;
Doing exists although there is no doer;
Extinction is but no extinguished person;
Although there is a path, there is no goer. (translated by Bhikkhu Nyanamoli)
《清淨道論(第14卷-第23卷)》卷16:
「有苦何等無苦者,無作者而存行作,
 有滅而無入滅者,有道而無行道者。」(CBETA, N69, no. 35, p. 140, a3-4 // PTS. Vism. 513)
如主張 not-self 而否定 no-self 會解釋不通。
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朱倍賢
加州大學佛學博士、碩士、心理學學士。西來大學終生職佛學教授及研究生導師。主要研究專案包括:原始佛教及經典(漢傳阿含及巴利尼柯耶)、禪定學、佛教心理學、教理史、漢傳佛教疑偽經學、近現代中國佛教思想(印順、呂澂思想、《批判佛教》)  
1974年生於臺灣台中市。孩童時移居美國。於高中遍閱南北傳經藏,開辦美西第一所佛教圖書館,並於其時潛心於中西方著名佛教專家( 印順法師、菩提比丘)之著作。
大學時代起,歸心原始佛法,實務於禪修。廣於親近諸多國際禪定學大師、熟稔上座部佛教眾多當今流傳派別之禪法。並於美國國內外推廣還真於歷史佛陀的教法。根本導師為上座部林居(森林)傳承者坦尼沙羅比丘(阿姜傑夫,即阿姜曼、阿姜李、阿姜放之傳人)

6 則留言:

  1. 《雜阿含335經》:「云何為第一義空經?諸比丘!眼生時無有來處,滅時無有去處。如是眼不實而生,生已盡滅,有業報而無作者,此陰滅已,異陰相續,除俗數法。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 92, c16-19)
    《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷9〈分別世品 3〉:「世尊亦言:『有業有異熟,作者不可得。謂能捨此蘊及能續餘蘊,唯除法假。』」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 47, c4-5)
    《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷30〈破執我品 9〉:「如勝義空契經中說:『有業有異熟,作者不可得。謂能捨此蘊及能續餘蘊,唯除法假。』」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 155, b25-27)。
    《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷25:「如世尊說:『有業有異熟,作者不可得。謂能捨此蘊及能續餘蘊,唯除法假。』」(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 485, a15-17)
    巴利《清淨道論》呼應了此一教導:
    For there is suffering, but none who suffers;
    Doing exists although there is no doer;
    Extinction is but no extinguished person;
    Although there is a path, there is no goer. (translated by Bhikkhu Nyanamoli)
    《清淨道論(第14卷-第23卷)》卷16:
    「有苦何等無苦者,無作者而存行作,
     有滅而無入滅者,有道而無行道者。」(CBETA, N69, no. 35, p. 140, a3-4 // PTS. Vism. 513)
    如主張 not-self 而否定 no-self 會解釋不通。

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  2. 相應部22相應96經(莊春江譯)

    那時,世尊以手取一小牛糞團,然後對那位比丘這麼說:
      「比丘!單這麼一點也沒有常的、堅固的、常恒的、不變易法將保持著同樣的永恒。
      比丘!如果單這麼一點也有常的、堅固的、常恒的、不變易法,這為了苦的完全滅盡之梵行生活,就不可能被了知。

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  3. 《雜阿含264經》卷10:「如是我聞:
    一時,佛住舍衛國祇樹給孤獨園。時,有異比丘於禪中思惟,作是念:「頗有色常、恒、不變易、正住耶?如是受、想、行、識,常、恒、不變易、正住耶?」
    是比丘晡時從禪起,往詣佛所,頭面禮足,却住一面,白佛言:「世尊!我於禪中思惟,作是念:『頗有色常、恒、不變易、正住耶?如是受、想、行、識,常、恒、不變易、正住耶?』今白世尊,頗有色常、恒、不變易、正住耶?頗有受、想、行、識,常、恒、不變易、正住耶?」
    爾時,世尊手執小土摶,告彼比丘言:「汝見我手中土摶不?」
    比丘白佛:「已見。世尊!」
    「比丘!如是少土,我不可得。若我可得者,則是常、恒、不變易、正住法。」」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 67, c4-16)。
    《中阿含61經》卷11〈王相應品 6〉:「於是,世尊以手指爪抄少牛糞,告曰:「比丘!汝今見我以手指爪抄少牛糞耶?」比丘白曰:「見也。世尊!」
    佛復告曰比丘:「如是,無有少色常住不變,而一向樂,恒久存也。如是,無有少覺、想、行、識常住不變,而一向樂,恒久存也。」(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 496, a28-b4)

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  4. 淺見以為,若以雜阿含372經.SN12.12的文意(以及SN12.35)看,俱舍論針對雜阿含372經的解釋似乎與原義明顯不同:
    A.阿毘達磨俱舍論 (卷30)~玄奘

    如勝義空契經中說。有業有異熟。作者不可得。謂能捨此蘊及能續餘蘊。唯除法假。故佛已遮。頗勒具那契經亦說。我終不說有能取者。故定無一補特伽羅能於世間取捨諸蘊
    PS頗勒具那 即雜阿含372經的頗求那

    B1
    雜阿含372經SN12.12
    {..[我不說言有取者],我若說言有取者,汝應問言為誰取。汝應問言:何緣故有取?我應答言:[愛緣故有取],取緣有..}

    B2
    Lord, who craves?"
    "Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. "I don't say 'craves.' If I were to say 'craves,' then 'Who craves?' would be a valid question. But I don't say that. When I don't say that, the valid question is 'From what as a requisite condition comes craving?' And the valid answer is, 'From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance.'"
    http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn-12-012-tb0.html

    B3
    "Which birth, lord? And whose is this birth?"
    "Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth."
    http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.035.than.html

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  5. 淺見以為,若以雜阿含372經.SN12.12的文意(以及SN12.35)看,俱舍論針對雜阿含372經的解釋似乎與原義明顯不同:
    A.阿毘達磨俱舍論 (卷30)~玄奘

    如勝義空契經中說。有業有異熟。作者不可得。謂能捨此蘊及能續餘蘊。唯除法假。故佛已遮。頗勒具那契經亦說。我終不說有能取者。故定無一補特伽羅能於世間取捨諸蘊
    PS頗勒具那 即雜阿含372經的頗求那

    B1
    雜阿含372經SN12.12
    {..[我不說言有取者],我若說言有取者,汝應問言為誰取。汝應問言:何緣故有取?我應答言:[愛緣故有取],取緣有..}

    B2
    Lord, who craves?"
    "Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. "I don't say 'craves.' If I were to say 'craves,' then 'Who craves?' would be a valid question. But I don't say that. When I don't say that, the valid question is 'From what as a requisite condition comes craving?' And the valid answer is, 'From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance.'"
    http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn-12-012-tb0.html

    B3
    "Which birth, lord? And whose is this birth?"
    "Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth."
    http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.035.than.html

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  6. Dear lee yenchun:

    你提到的,
    《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷30〈破執我品 9〉:「如勝義空契經中說。有業有異熟。作者不可得。謂能捨此蘊及能續餘蘊。唯除法假。故佛已遮。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 155, b25-28)。
    此經即是指《雜阿含335經》:「云何為第一義空經?」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 92, c16)。
    《SN 12.12》或《雜阿含372經》的敘述則是從另一角度敘說。
    即使兩組經典文字不同,義理、法義並無差異。

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